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ABSTRACT 
This paper reports on the navigation activities during 
Rosetta’s Mars swing-by. It covers the Mars approach 
phase starting after a deterministic deep-space 
manoeuvre in September 2006, the  
swing-by proper on 25 February 2007, and ends with 
another deterministic deep-space manoeuvre in April 
2007 which was also foreseen to compensate any 
navigation error. Emphasis is put on the orbit 
determination and prediction set-up and the evolution of 
the targeting estimates in the B-plane and their 
adjustments by trajectory correction manoeuvres.  
1. INTRODUCTION 
Rosetta is a planetary cornerstone mission in ESA's 
long-term space science program. Its destination is the 
injection into orbit around comet 67P/Churyumov-
Gerasimenko. Launched in March 2004 with an Ariane-
5/G1 it utilises four planetary swing-by manoeuvres 
(gravity assists) in order to get the correct Earth escape 
velocity to reach the comet in May 2014.  
The first swing-by was around Earth and took place one 
year after launch on 4 March 2005. The navigation 
aspects from launch up to and including the first Earth 
swing-by are detailed in [1]. The second swing-by, 
around Mars, took place on 25 February 2007 and is the 
subject of this paper.  It is followed soon after by an 
Earth swing-by on 13 November 2007. Finally, Rosetta 
will return to Earth in November 2009 to get its final 
boost to the comet.  
In terms of navigation the Mars swing-by is the most 
demanding and critical exercise during Rosetta's whole 
long-lasting heliocentric cruise up until arrival at the 
comet. The reason for this is mainly that  
1. it is the only swing-by around a distant planet 
which is always more difficult to navigate than an 
Earth swing-by; the geocentric distance of Rosetta 
at the Mars swing-by is 2.1 AU; 
2. the nominal pericentre altitude is just 250 km above 
the surface of Mars which is by far lower than the 
pericentre altitudes required at all Earth swing-bys. 
This paper focuses on the navigation aspects for the 
Mars swing-by. The next section describes the 
heliocentric trajectory and activities after the first Earth 
swing-by until the Mars swing-by. In this way this paper 
serves as a continuation of [1] in the chronology of the 
Rosetta mission. Section 3 gives details about the 
geometry of the swing-by trajectory whereas section 4 
and 5 focus on the navigation aspects of the Mars 
swing-by.  
2. HELOCENTRIC TRAJECTORY FROM THE 
1ST EARTH SWING-BY TO MARS SWING-BY 
After the Earth swing-by Rosetta headed out to an 
aphelion of 1.7 AU which it reached in December 2005. 
Returning back to its perihelion at 1.0 AU, which it 
reached at the end of September 2006, a deterministic 
trajectory correction manoeuvre (TCM) of size 31.8 m/s 
was executed. This was TCM-7 in the chronology of the 
Rosetta mission. No TCM was required to compensate 
for any swing-by errors immediately after the Earth 
swing-by. The cost was less than 1 cm/s and it was 
completely absorbed in the design of TCM-7. Hence, 
Rosetta had a period of almost 19 months – one 
complete orbit around the Sun - without any TCM.  
During this period its maximum distance from the Earth 
was 2.7 AU. 
Since Rosetta is a three-axis stabilised spacecraft with 
an attitude control that uses reaction wheels, momentum 
desaturation or wheel-off-loading (WOLs) manoeuvres 
are to be executed regularly to remove the accumulated 
angular momentum from the wheels. During this period 
of time this has been done on average once per week. 
Rosetta is equipped with a balanced thrust system so, 
nominally, the WOLs should exhibit pure torques 
without causing any perturbations on the trajectory. 
However, small orbital effects of the order of less than 1 
mm/s are routinely observed in the orbit determination.  
During this TCM-free period the demand on navigation 
and trajectory control was relatively low. The spacecraft 
activities were restricted to the platform or the payload. 
Form July to August 2005 and from May to July 2006 
Rosetta was put into so-called Near Sun Hibernation 
Mode (NSHM). During the hibernation the spacecraft 
activities and contact periods are reduced to a minimum 
by doing a spacecraft health check just once per week. 
During NSHM the reaction wheels are spun down and 
the attitude control is based on thruster actuations. Not 
using the wheels will extend their lifetimes and is the 
main reason for having NSHM periods.  
Rosetta has exhibited furthermore a superior solar 
conjunction from March to May 2006 with a minimum 
Sun-Earth-spacecraft angle of 0.54º which caused the 
signal between Rosetta and the ground station on Earth 
to come as close as 2.2 solar radii to the centre of the 
Sun. Due to turbulent plasma effects in the solar corona 
this caused a degradation of the tracking data quality 
and hence a degradation in the orbit determination and 
prediction performance. More details on Rosetta’s solar 
conjunction period are given in [2].  
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20080012630 2019-08-29T19:10:18+00:00Z
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With TCM-7 on 29 September 2006 the Mars swing-by 
phase formally started. Fig. 1 shows the ecliptic 
projection of the Rosetta trajectory and the orbit of 
Earth and Mars during the Mars swing-by phase. 
Directions from Rosetta to Earth and Mars are given 
every 20 days. All TCMs are shown not to scale but 
with their corresponding components of directions in 
the ecliptic plane.  
TCM-7 was a deterministic, retrograde manoeuvre at 
Rosetta’s perihelion. Its purpose was to get the Mars 
swing-by conditions correct, i.e. it moved the expected 
coordinates in the B-plane by more than 450,000 km 
(the definition of the B-plane can be found in Section 
5). The manoeuvre was executed with a slight over-
performance (see Table 1), but since the manoeuvre was 
relatively big and the time until the swing-by was still 
quite long, Rosetta ended up in the B-plane still 756 km 
away from the fuel-optimum target point.  
It was decided to make a touch-up manoeuvre rather 
early to move the expected coordinates in the B-plane 
close to the optimum target instead of doing it later, 
closer to Mars. TCM-8 was executed on 13 November 
2006 with a magnitude of 9.9 cm/s. Unfortunately, two 
WOLs had to be placed relatively close before and after 
TCM-8 without any tracking data in between which 
made it impossible to calibrate TCM-8 in the orbit 
determination independently from the WOLs. Therefore 
the best estimate of the manoeuvre performance was 
unusually high (see Table 1) but also with a high formal 
1σ uncertainty of 1.3 %. However, spacecraft telemetry 
indicated that the manoeuvre performance was rather 
close to nominal.  After TCM-8 the expected 
coordinates in the B-plane were 36.3 km from the 
optimum target. 
TCM-9 was executed on 09 February 2007, i.e. 16 days 
before the Mars swing-by and was of size 4.55 cm/s. It 
was designed specifically to get the swing-by conditions 
correct. It is further detailed in Section 5.2.  
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Table 1: Trajectory control manoeuvres (TCMs). TCM 1 to 6 
have been repeated from [1] for the reader’s convenience; 
TCM 7 to 10 are described in this paper 
   Date Size Performance 
1 03 Mar 2004 1.0 m/s -2.2% 
2 10 May 2004 152.8 m/s +0.01% 
3 16 May 2004 5.0 m/s +0.06% 
4 25 Nov 2004 16.6 cm/s Anomalous 
5 09 Dec 2004 11.6 cm/s +0.5 % 
6 17 Feb 2005 8.5 cm/s +0.3% 
7 29 Sep 2006 31.8 m/s +0.3% 
8 13 Nov 2006 9.9 cm/s  +2.4% 
9 09 Feb 2007 4.55 cm/s +0.3% 
10 26 Apr 2007 6.5 m/s +0.65 % 
 
TCM-10 was a partly deterministic and a partly 
stochastic manoeuvre and was executed on 26 April 
2007 close to aphelion. The purpose of the stochastic 
part was to compensate any navigation error from the 
Mars swing-by. The purpose of the deterministic part 
was to obtain the correct phasing for the subsequent 
Earth swing-by in November 2007. The deterministic 
part was of size 6.3 m/s, the actual fuel optimised 
manoeuvre was 6.5 m/s, i.e. the navigation error at the 
Mars swing-by resulted in a ∆v penalty of 0.2 m/s. With 
TCM-10, Rosetta’s Mars swing-by phase was formally 
completed. 
3. SWING-BY TRAJECTORY AND 
OPERATIONS 
The Mars swing-by itself actually reduced the 
heliocentric velocity of Rosetta by 2.2 km/s. The swing-
by parameters as determined after the swing-by are 
summarised in Table 2. The osculating orbital elements 
are based on the epoch of the pericentre passage and are 
given with respect to the mean Earth equator at J2000.  
Table 2: Mars swing-by parameters 
Pericentre at 25 February 2007 01:59:04.46 TDB 
Pericentre Radius 3648.084 km 
Pericentre Velocity 10.053 km/s 
Semi-major Axis  -551.986 km 
Eccentricity 7.609013 
Inclination 156.827º 
R.A. of Ascending Node 135.369º 
Argument or Pericentre 154.902º 
Asymptotic Velocity 8.808 km/s 
Semi-deflection Angle 7.552º 
Heliocentric: 
Velocity Vector Change 
 
2.315 km/s 
Velocity Magnitude Change -2.193 km/s 
Velocity Direction Change 1.856º 
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Figure 2 shows the ecliptic projection of the swing-by 
geometry over a period of 6 hours centred at the time of 
pericentre passage. Tick marks are given every hour. 
The direction to the Sun and the Earth are given. The 
distances at the time of the swing-by were 1.4 AU to the 
Sun and 2.1 AU to the Earth. The latter corresponds to a 
1-way light time of 17min 33s.  
Also shown in Figure 2 are an eclipse and an occultation 
occurring during the swing-by. The occultation started 
1min 48s before and lasted until 12min 38s after 
pericentre passage (14min 26s duration). The eclipse 
started 11s after and lasted until 25min after pericentre 
passage (24min 49s duration). The eclipse was 
considered as critical since Rosetta was not designed for 
eclipses. The spacecraft design was based on the 
original trajectory to comet 46P/Wirtanen which was 
free of eclipses. After the re-design of the mission [3] 
after a one year launch delay to the now actually flown 
mission, Rosetta had to cope with an eclipse at the Mars 
swing-by. It was and will be the only eclipse during the 
whole mission.  
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Figure 2: Ecliptic projection of Rosetta’s Mars swing-by  
 
Due to this criticality, all power-consuming devices on 
board that were not absolutely necessary during the 
eclipsed phase of the swing-by were switched off. Two 
of these were the X-band transmitter and the ultra stable 
oscillator (USO). The S-band transmitter was kept on 
during the whole time. The USO was switched off about 
65 min and the X-band transmitter was switched off 
about 50 min before entering eclipse. The X-band 
uplink was intended to be kept until shortly before the 
occultation started and then to bring it down in a 
controlled manner. So the expectation was that 2-way 
coherent X band up and X band down tracking data 
would be acquired up until about 50 min before eclipse 
and 2-way coherent X band up and S band down 
tracking data would be acquired almost up until start of 
occultation. However, the on-board X-band receiver lost 
lock when the USO was switched off one hour before 
entering the occultation. This was an oversight in the 
flight operations procedure since this behaviour between 
USO and on-board receiver was known in advance but 
was overlooked when setting up the procedure. It was 
decided not to re-establish the 2-way link before the 
occultation, resulting in a lack of 2-way tracking data 
for more than one hour before the pericentre passage. 
After the eclipse when the X-band transmitter was 
switched on again the signal could be flawlessly re-
acquired and a 2-way link was established soon 
afterwards. It was also intended to start ranging from 
then onwards. However, after having ranging started the 
range ambiguity in the tracking receiver on ground did 
not resolve. It was presumed that this was due to an 
instability in the tracking system and it was decided not 
to restart ranging for the remainder of the station pass in 
order not to destabilise ongoing operations.  
The Mars swing-by was considered to be a good 
opportunity for payload activities. However, for the 
safety of the mission, it had to be ensured that the 
navigation process was not disturbed. It was agreed that 
payload activities were omitted entirely during the 
approach phase up until two days before the swing-by 
(see section 4.1). It was considered that activities two 
days before the swing-by would hardly have any effect 
on the navigation results or could lead to a situation that 
the orbital knowledge was lost to an extent that would 
jeopardise the mission. This approach also allowed 
omitting the execution of WOLs in the time period 
between TCM-9 and the start of the payload activities. 
This was possible because no spacecraft slews were 
performed and the reaction control wheels had just to 
cope mostly with the perturbing torques originating 
from the solar radiation pressure.  
On 22 February the first WOL since 7 February was 
executed and the payload instruments were activated. 
On 23 February the spacecraft was slewed to allow the 
payload to perform calibrations of the instruments. The 
actual observations were performed in a four hours slot 
on 24 February 18:00 to 22:00 UTC, i.e. approximately 
four hours before pericentre passage when the 
spacecraft was at a distance of less than 250,000 km 
from Mars. At the start and end of the slot the spacecraft 
was slewed to and from a special observations attitude.  
But since Rosetta is equipped with a steerable, two-
degree of freedom high-gain antenna, Earth 
communication and tracking could be maintained during 
the observations period. Only during the half hour 
duration of the actual slews was communication with 
the spacecraft lost.  
For optical navigation, Rosetta is equipped with a 5º 
field-of-view navigation camera. Its purpose is to aid 
the navigation process when performing the two 
foreseen asteroid fly-bys at Steins in 2008 and Lutetia in 
2011 and during the approach to comet 
67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko in 2014 and thereafter. 
Images from the target relative to the star background 
are then going to be used to determine accurately the 
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relative position between Rosetta and the target body. In 
the original mission to comet 46P/Wirtanen, a foreseen 
possibility was to use the navigation camera to support 
the navigation at the Mars swing-by. A mission 
requirement stated that during the approach to Mars the 
radio-frequency tracking should be augmented with 
optical observables using the navigation camera system. 
However, an analysis was performed well before launch 
that concluded that neither the Mars limb nor the 
Martian Moons could be meaningfully used as target to 
aid the navigation process mainly because of poor 
geometric and illumination conditions. After the re-
design of the mission to the now actually flown mission 
[3] the conditions during the Mars approach would have 
been favourable for optical navigation. Nevertheless, the 
possibility of using optical data was not re-considered 
because it was clear at that time that Delta Differential 
One-Way Range (∆DOR) measurements will augment 
the conventional Doppler and range tracking data 
instead (see Section 4.3) to ensure successful navigation 
when approaching Mars. Nevertheless, the navigation 
camera was switched on and took images in the four 
hours active payload slot before the Mars swing-by, 
mainly for gaining experience with the camera in an 
operational environment and for public relations 
purposes. Figure 3 shows such an image of Mars. It was 
taken on 24 February 2007 at 18:32 UTC from a 
distance of 237,477 km. More details about the image 
are given in [4].  
 
 
 
Figure 3: Mars as seen by Rosetta’s navigation camera 
 
Payload activities at closest approach were not possible 
because of the aforementioned critical power situation 
during the eclipse. However, one exception was the 
lander Philae that is mounted on Rosetta. Philae is due 
to land on comet 67P/Churyumov-Gerasimenko in 2014 
after Rosetta has reached its destination. Therefore, 
Philae has its own power system that can cope with 
eclipses. During the pericentre passage Philae took 
spectacular looking images of Mars with parts of 
Rosetta in the foreground [5]. 
4. ORBIT DETERMINATION SET-UP 
Navigation of the spacecraft for the Mars swing-by was 
based on the interplanetary orbit determination system 
[6] that had been developed to support all the Agency’s 
recent deep space missions that include Mars Express 
(MEX), Smart-1 and Venus Express (VEX), as well as 
Rosetta. At the time of the Mars swing-by this system 
had been successfully used operationally for almost four 
years, especially during highly demanding navigation 
phases such as MEX Beagle-2 release and Mars 
approach and orbit insertion, Smart-1 Moon orbit 
insertion and controlled impact, VEX Venus approach 
and orbit insertion, as well as of course the first Rosetta 
Earth swing-by. The navigation software can therefore 
be considered as being quiet mature. Nevertheless, an 
extensive navigation assurance campaign has been 
executed prior to the Mars swing-by led by the ESOC 
Flight Dynamics internal test and validation group. 
Details about the navigation assurance campaign can be 
found in [7]. 
For the approach phase the orbit determination program 
was set up in a special pre-defined configuration that 
will be described in the following subsections.  
4.1 Orbit Propagation 
Starting with an a priori spacecraft state at a chosen 
epoch the equations of motion are integrated 
numerically. The following forces are taken into 
account:  
• Newtonian point mass acceleration due to the Sun, 
all the planets, Pluto, and the Earth’s Moon; 
• perturbative relativistic acceleration due to the Sun; 
• solar radiation pressure (SRP) based on a 
sophisticated spacecraft model built up out of a 
cubic spacecraft box, solar arrays, and a high gain 
antenna with optical properties provided by the 
spacecraft manufacturer prior to launch; 
• accelerations due to TCMs and WOLs. 
 
In cruise, a SRP acceleration scale factor along the Sun-
spacecraft line was estimated during routine orbit 
determinations and indicated that the SRP model 
underestimates the actual acceleration by about 7.5%. 
However, this factor was relatively constant within a 
few tenths of a percent only when Rosetta was in its 
default Earth communications attitude. During periods 
when the spacecraft had a different attitude, especially 
over long periods of time in the order of a couple of 
days, different estimates down to 5% were obtained. 
The most likely cause for this discrepancy is the optical 
properties of the spacecraft’s surfaces. Therefore more 
than one piecewise constant SRP acceleration factor had 
to be estimated within the orbit determination whenever 
the spacecraft was not in its default attitude. This had of 
course an impact on the navigation results and it was 
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agreed (see Section 3) that during the approach phase no 
payload or platform activities were performed that 
required a slew of the spacecraft. Rosetta remained 
therefore in its default Earth communications attitude 
from 4 January to 22 February 2007.  
As mentioned already in Section 2, WOLs must be 
performed approximately once per week. Due to the 
balanced thrust system, these should ideally not 
generate any perturbations on the orbit. Nevertheless, a 
∆v with zero a priori components is estimated within 
the orbit determination whenever a WOL is executed. 
Almost all estimates of the ∆v magnitude were below 1 
mm/s. Nevertheless, it was agreed that no WOL would 
be executed in the period from 7 February to 22 
February 2007 (see Section 3) again to keep the orbital 
perturbations to a minimum.  
During most of the approach phase the centre of 
integration was the Sun. The sphere of influence of 
Mars was entered on 24 February 2007 at 07:51:51 
barycentric dynamical time (TDB), so at about 18 hours 
before pericentre passage. Then, the centre of 
integration was switched to Mars and it stayed like this 
until Mars’ sphere of influence was left again after the 
swing-by. While being within Mars’ sphere of influence 
the force model above was augmented by 
• a 16x16 Mars gravity field expansion; 
• Newtonian point mass attraction of Phobos and 
Deimos. 
4.2 Uncertain Parameters 
The orbit determination system uses a square root 
information filter (SRIF) that is based on an epoch-state 
formulation, i.e. the components of the spacecraft state 
vector are estimated at a fixed epoch (see [6] for more 
details). The spacecraft state vector can be augmented 
by a set of parameters that are also estimated during the 
orbit determination process (“solve-for” parameters). 
Additionally, another set of parameters can be chosen 
that are not estimated but their uncertainties contribute 
to the formal uncertainties of the solve-for parameters 
(“consider parameters”). The navigation results in the 
following are always based on the so-called “consider 
covariance”, i.e. the uncertainties of the consider 
parameters are taken into account. It is evident that 
these uncertainties can have a major contribution to the 
navigation results but also the chosen set of solve-for 
parameters and their a priori uncertainties play a 
significant role. All used solve-for and consider 
parameters together with their (a priori) uncertainties 
are summarised in Tables 3 and 4 respectively.  
A range bias per station pass has been estimated to 
absorb modelling errors originating from a poor 
knowledge of the transponder group delay, in particular 
its behaviour in different configurations and at different 
ambient temperatures. Furthermore, it absorbs group 
delays due to charged particles in the solar plasma. No 
solar plasma model has been applied when modelling 
the observables because its predictive capabilities are 
rather poor [2]. The observables have only been 
calibrated for ionospheric and tropospheric effects for 
which model parameter uncertainties have been 
considered (Table 4). Quasar directions uncertainties 
have also been considered that are relevant for ∆DOR 
measurements which are further explained in section 
4.3.  
Table 3: Estimated parameters and their a priori values and 
uncertainties 
 
Estimated 
parameters A priori value 
1σ a priori 
uncertainty 
spacecraft 
state at epoch 
taken from 
previous orbit 
determination 
1000 km 
10 m/s 
SRP factor 
along Sun-s/c +7.5% 3% 
WOL 0 
1 mm/s along 
each spacecraft 
body axis 
TCM as commanded 3% in magnitude 1.7 º in direction 
range bias per 
station pass 0 20 m (1-way) 
 
 
Table 4: Consider parameters and their uncertainties 
 
Consider parameters 1σ uncertainty 
SRP factor perpendicular 
to Sun-s/c 5% 
ESA stations location 10 cm in each direction 
DSN stations location as given in  [8] 
polar motion X and Y 30 nrad 
UTC-UT1 0.75 ms 
quasar directions as given in  [9] 
troposphere calibration 
(zenith delay) 
4 cm (wet part) 
1 cm (dry part) 
ionosphere calibration 25% 
transponder  group delay 10 ns 
Mars ephemeris 
position 
velocity 
 
1 km 
0.01 mm/s 
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4.3 Tracking Data 
Another main driver of the navigation results are the 
types of tracking data that have been used as well as 
their quantity and quality.  
Tracking Data Types 
During the Mars approach phase, Rosetta was tracked 
mainly from ESA's 35m antenna at New Norcia 
(Western Australia) and additionally from the NASA 
Deep Space Network (DSN). The DSN sites at 
Goldstone (California) and Madrid (Spain) were used 
mostly whereas, because of the overlapping times of 
visibility with New Norcia, antennas from the DSN site 
at Canberra (Eastern Australia) tracked Rosetta only 
occasionally. During the tracking passes conventional 2-
way X-band Doppler and range data were acquired. 
Within the orbit determination all the Doppler data were 
compressed to 60 s count time whereas range data 
points were just taken every 20 min for ESA and every 
3.5 min (on average) for DSN range data. The 
frequency of tracking passes steadily increased the 
closer Rosetta approached Mars, cumulating in around-
the-clock tracking starting at 2 days before and 
extending to about 12 hours after pericentre passage.  
The conventional tracking data were augmented by a 
radio interferometric type measurement called Delta 
Differential One-Way Range (∆DOR). ∆DOR requires 
two widely separated ground stations to measure the 
difference in the arrival time of the signal from both 
Rosetta and a directionally close-by extragalactic radio 
source (quasar) whose inertial direction is precisely 
known. It provides a direct measurement of one 
coordinate of Rosetta's position in the plane-of-sky 
which is a perfect complement to the line-of-sight 
Doppler and range measurements.  
Figure 4 shows a world map with the locations of the 
participating ground stations. Stations in red are ESA 
stations, those in blue are NASA/DSN stations. Also 
drawn with the same colour code are the projected 
baselines connecting two groundstations that have taken 
∆DOR measurements.  
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Figure 4: Tracking Stations and Baselines 
 
The spacecraft position coordinate that is measured by a 
∆DOR data point is along these baselines projected onto 
the plane-of-sky. Yellow areas in Figure 4 indicate 
subsatellite points for which two stations have mutual 
visibility above 10º elevation. The limiting geocentric 
latitude for usage of the baseline Goldstone – Madrid in 
the southern direction is -22º. Rosetta spent most of the 
time during the approach phase far down in the southern 
hemisphere moving southwards through -22º geocentric  
latitude on 17 December 2006, reaching a minimum of -
24.3º on 17 January 2007 and moved across -22º 
northwards again on 19 February 2007. The 
consequence was that the baseline Goldstone – Madrid 
could only rarely be used. The last ∆DOR measurement 
from this baseline before mutual visibility was lost was 
taken on 18 December 2006 (with one station having 
elevations below 10º). The first ∆DOR measurement 
after the period of mutual invisibility was resumed on 
20 February 2007, 5 days before the swing-by. 
Therefore, the majority of ∆DOR measurements during 
the entire approach phases were utilising the Goldstone 
– Canberra and New Norcia – Cebreros baselines. 
However, this was by no means a disadvantage because 
- as can be seen in Figure 4 - these baselines are almost 
perpendicular to each other and therefore providing 
information in two almost perpendicular directions on 
the plane-of-sky. How this improved the navigation 
solutions is further detailed in Section 5.1. As for the 
conventional tracking data, the frequency of ∆DOR 
measurements increased the closer Rosetta approached 
Mars, cumulating in two ∆DOR sessions per day over 
almost one week up until two days before pericentre 
passage. 
Tracking Data Arc 
The used tracking data arc was a relatively long one 
starting on 14 November 2006, i.e. covering a period of 
103 days until the swing-by. Orbit determination 
solutions using  shorter arcs were also regularly made 
and compared but it turned out that the long arc solution 
provided the most stable and reliable results. In 
particular, the predictive capabilities of the long-arc 
solution were superior to those of short arc solutions. 
This was seen best when residuals of new tracking data 
were processed based on an orbit prediction of a 
previous solution (“pass-through”). The residuals based 
on orbit predictions of short arc solutions exhibited 
jumps and drifts indicating a less accurate orbit 
prediction. All navigation results used at that time and 
presented here are therefore based on the long-arc 
solutions.  
In total, an orbit determination using the full long arc 
solution starting from 14 November 2006 up until the 
swing-by on 25 February 2007 made use of   
• 4,188 2-way range measurements; 
• 34,957 2-way Doppler measurements; 
• 32 New Norcia – Cebreros  ∆DORs; 
• 40 Goldstone – Canberra ∆DORs; 
• 5 Goldstone – Madrid ∆DORs. 
All tracking data were acquired at X-band frequencies. 
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The last ∆DOR was taken in the morning of 23 
February 2007. The last Doppler and range 
measurements prior to the swing-by were taken at 01:10 
UTC on 25 February 2007, almost one hour before 
pericentre passage.  No more 2-way data were acquired 
due to the oversight in the flight operations procedure as 
explained in Section 3. The orbit determination program 
is not able to process 1-way data that anyways is far less 
precise than 2-way data. 
Tracking Data Quality and Weighting 
The expected accuracy of 2-way X-band range data is in 
the order of a couple of metres for both ESA and DSN 
data. The experience has shown that the ranging 
performance is slightly better at DSN stations then at 
ESA stations but nevertheless the measurement 1σ 
standard deviation of each range point was set to 5 m. 
The higher sampling frequency of the DSN range 
compared to the ESA range has taken account of the 
different ranging performances within the orbit 
determination. The a posteriori root mean square 
(RMS) value of all range residuals computed in an orbit 
determination using the long data arc of 103 days was 
0.83 m.  
The expected accuracy of 2-way X-band Doppler 
compressed to 60 s count time is in the order of 0.1 
mm/s or better for both ESA and DSN data. The 
experience has shown equal data quality at both station 
networks. The 1σ standard deviation of each Doppler 
point was set conservatively to 0.2 mm/s within the 
orbit determination. The a posteriori RMS value of all 
2-way range-rate residuals computed in an orbit 
determination using the long data arc of 103 days was 
0.12 mm/s. 
The 1σ standard deviation of the NASA/DSN ∆DORs 
was supplied for each measurement by JPL as 
recommended data weight and was followed in all 
cases. The actual ∆DOR measurement is a time delay 
and for all of them the recommendation was 0.25 ns. 
The a posteriori RMS value of all NASA/DSN ∆DOR 
residuals computed in an orbit determination using the 
long data arc of 103 days was 0.16 ns. 
The capability to acquire DOR measurements at ESA 
stations is relatively new and the system is not yet as 
mature as the DSN system. It has been developed within 
ESA in a very short time frame to support the VEX 
Venus approach and orbit insertion in April 2006 which 
it did very successfully. The Rosetta Mars swing-by was 
the second opportunity to use this system in a critical 
and navigation demanding time period. The 1σ standard 
deviation of the ESA ∆DORs was also supplied for each 
measurement by the ESA ∆DOR team as recommended 
data weight and was followed in all cases. The 
recommendations varied between 0.4 ns and 3.7 ns but 
were on average about 0.6 ns. Standard deviations larger 
than 2.0 ns were recommended for 6 measurements. The 
reason for these relatively high measurement 
uncertainties originated from either an unexpected low 
level of correlated quasar flux, a not perfectly clean 
spacecraft carrier signal, a large spacecraft-Earth-quasar 
separation angle (> 10º), or a combination of these. 
Standard deviations of all other but one measurement 
were below 1 ns. The a posteriori RMS value of all 
ESA ∆DOR residuals computed in an orbit 
determination using the long data arc of 103 days was 
0.53 ns. The accuracy requirement for the ∆DOR 
system development was stated to be 1.0 ns which was 
clearly met.  
Figure 5 shows the a posteriori ∆DOR residuals from 
the 103 days long arc solution. Red crosses indicate 
ESA ∆DORs along the baseline New-Norcia – 
Cebreros, closed blue dots indicate NASA/DSN ∆DORs 
along the baseline Goldstone – Canberra, and open blue 
dots indicate NASA/DSN ∆DORs along the baseline 
Goldstone – Madrid. The ESA ∆DOR residuals that are 
larger in magnitude than 0.6 ns correspond to the ones 
with the aforementioned large standard deviations.  
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Figure 5: Rosetta ∆DOR Residuals 
5. TARGETING FOR THE MARS SWING-BY 
Navigation results when approaching a planet are 
typically described as B-plane coordinates.  The B-plane 
is a plane passing through the target body centre and is 
perpendicular to the asymptote (vector S) of the 
incoming trajectory (assuming Keplerian motion). The 
B-vector is a vector in that plane, from the planet centre 
to the piercing point of the trajectory asymptote. The B-
vector specifies where the point of closest approach 
would be if the target planet had no mass and did not 
deflect the flight path. The abscissa, T, is specified here 
to be the projection of the Mars equator of date. The 
ordinate, R, completes the orthogonal right-handed triad 
with S and T. Trajectory errors in the B-plane are 
characterised by 3σ dispersion ellipses.  
The trajectory design group within the Flight Dynamics 
team defined the global fuel-optimum target point in the 
B-plane. The navigation group performed after each 
orbit determination a mapping of the estimated 
spacecraft state at epoch and its consider covariance 
matrix to the predicted time of closest approach. 
Thereby future uncertainties originating for instance 
from future WOLs were taken into account. The B-
plane vector and its associated uncertainties in form of 
3σ error ellipse parameters were then computed from 
the predicted state and consider covariance matrix at 
pericentre. 
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5.1 The Power of ∆DOR 
It has been explained before that ∆DOR is a direct 
measurement of one coordinate of Rosetta's position in 
the plane-of-sky. How accurate were these position 
measurements at the Rosetta Mars swing-by? The 
accuracy is directly proportional to the length of the 
baseline connecting the two participating ground 
stations. The baseline New Norcia – Cebreros has a 
length of 11,625 km. The aforementioned a posteriori 
RMS of 0.53 ns for ESA ∆DORs translates then into an 
angular accuracy of 13.7 nrad or a position accuracy at 
Rosetta’s distance at that time of 4.3 km. The baseline 
Goldstone - Canberra has a length of 10,589 km. The 
aforementioned a posteriori RMS of 0.16 ns for 
NASA/DSN ∆DORs translates then into an angular 
accuracy of 4.5 nrad or position accuracy at Rosetta’s 
distance at that time of 1.4 km.  
If only conventional Doppler and range tracking data 
were available then no direct measure of the plane-of-
sky components would have been available. In this case 
the plane-of-sky information had to be deduced solely 
from the diurnal sinusoidal modulation of the Earth 
rotation on the range and Doppler data. From a 
complete pass this modulation indirectly gives 
information on the plane-of-sky components: the phase 
of the modulation is directly related to the spacecraft’s 
geocentric right ascension and the amplitude to the 
spacecraft’s geocentric declination. The determination 
of the spacecraft right ascension from a 12 hours pass of 
Doppler data with the aforementioned accuracy of 0.1 
mm/s yields an accuracy of about 50 nrad. The 
determination of the geocentric declination is sensitive 
to the actual declination itself: it is worst when it 
approaches zero. During the Mars approach phase the 
situation was favourable because Rosetta was below -20 
deg declination most of the time. Nevertheless, a 12 
hours pass of Doppler data with the aforementioned 
accuracy would determine the declination even under 
these favourable conditions only to an accuracy of the 
order of 50 to 100 nrad. It needs to be stressed that – 
although the duration of visibility would have permitted 
it - none of the Rosetta passes had a duration of 12 
hours but were more in the order of 6-10 hours due to 
scheduling constraints. DSN passes were only 4 hours 
long making it difficult to detect the sinusoidal 
modulation on the Doppler data to sufficient accuracy. 
Therefore, if no ∆DOR were available there would have 
been an impact on the station scheduling during the 
approach phase.  
Figure 6 shows navigation results – best estimates of the 
target points and the corresponding 3σ uncertainty – in 
the B-plane using different sets of tracking data. This 
was done regularly during the approach phase to ensure 
consistency of the solutions.  The particular example 
here has been generated with a data arc starting on 14 
November 2006 up until 29 January 2007, so before 
TCM-9. As can be seen, the best estimates of the target 
points are about 58 km away from the optimum target 
(green cross) and it was the goal of TCM-9 to move 
these 58 km across the B-plane (see next section). The 
red dotted line in the upper right corner denotes the 
impact contour of the surface of Mars in the B-plane. 
The different data sets used to generate the displayed 
solutions were: 
1. range & Doppler only (black ellipse); 
2. as 1. plus NASA/DSN ∆DORs (orange ellipse); 
3. as 1. plus ESA ∆DORs (brown ellipse); 
4. as 1 plus ESA & NASA/DSN ∆DORs (blue ellipse; 
the annotation gives the dimension of the ellipses 
semi-axes).  
Comparing the blue and the black ellipses clearly shows 
how ∆DOR improves the knowledge of the spacecraft 
trajectory. The area of the black ellipse corresponds to 
7070 km2; the area of the blue ellipse corresponds to 
662 km2, i.e. a reduction in size by more than one 
magnitude.  Also visible in Figure 6 are the directions of 
the different baselines as they are projected into the B-
plane (see also Figure 4). The majority of the 
NASA/DSN ∆DORs were obtained using the baseline 
Goldstone – Canberra which gives information in the B-
plane mostly in the radial direction. The ESA ∆DORs 
were obtained from the baseline New Norcia – Cebreros 
which gives information almost perpendicular to the 
former one. This complementary characteristic of the 
∆DOR datasets was a big advantage for the navigation 
process during the entire Mars approach phase.  
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Figure 6: B-plane solutions using different data sets 
5.2 Design of TCM-9 
The final planning for TCM-9 was made based on an 
orbit determined using data up until 5 February 2007, 
i.e. data cut-off was 4 days before manoeuvre execution. 
Figure 7 shows the situation in the B-plane. The blue 
cross and error ellipse are the location and 3-σ 
uncertainty as they were estimated at the time TCM-9 
was planned. The red ellipse and its centre are the 
estimates using data up to the time when the spacecraft 
slewed to the manoeuvre attitude shortly before TCM-9.  
The black ellipse and its centre are the results using 
additionally the Doppler data acquired up to almost 
three hours after the manoeuvre.  
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Figure 7: Design of TCM-9 in the B-plane  
 
The thin red line denotes the movement of the target 
point within the B-plane of 60.7 km due to a nominal 
manoeuvre size of 4.55 cm/s. The end point of the red 
line and the black cross are not exactly at the same 
location but the difference is too small to be seen in the 
plot.  In mapping the errors to after the manoeuvre, the 
1σ dispersion (cf. Table 3) was assumed to be 3% on 
the manoeuvre magnitude and 1.7º in direction, both of 
which were conservative. Because of the orbital change 
between manoeuvre planning and execution, it was then 
expected to end up 5.2 km from the optimum target 
location (green cross in Figure 7). 
5.3 Evolution of B-plane Estimates and Errors 
After TCM-9 four more potential manoeuvre slots had 
been allocated: one week, three days, one day, and 6 
hours before the swing-by. Associated with each 
manoeuvre slot was a Flight Rule that determined under 
which circumstances a manoeuvre should be executed. 
Having followed those rules, no further manoeuvre was 
executed prior to the swing-by although Rosetta was not 
heading towards the optimum target point. More details 
on the Flight Rules can be found in [7]. 
Figure 8 shows the variations in the estimates and the 
accompanying uncertainties after TCM-9 up to the 
swing-by. As before, the annotations give the time when 
the results were determined and the sizes of the error 
ellipses semi-axes. The black ellipse is the same as the 
post-manoeuvre ellipse of Figure 7.  Note that compared 
to Figure 7 the scale in Figure 8 is halved. 
Progressively, the red, blue, orange, and green crosses 
and ellipses correspond to times when the Flight Rules 
for the manoeuvres slots were evaluated. The magenta 
cross and ellipse show the results a few hours before the 
swing-by. The ellipse size at that time has shrunk to an 
area of 283 km2. The purple cross and ellipse are the 
results using data up to the morning of 26 February 
2007, i.e. a little more than one day after the swing-by. 
The area of the post swing-by 3σ error ellipse is smaller 
than 0.008 km2.  
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Figure 8: Evolution of B-plane estimates 
5.4 Navigation Results 
The final location in the B-plane was 8.3 km from the 
optimum target. The estimate for the altitude at closest 
approach was 250.6 km above Mars’ surface with a 3σ 
uncertainty of 1.1 km. The estimate for the time of 
closest approach was 01:57:59.28 UTC on 25 February 
2007 with a 3σ uncertainty of 0.02 s. The prediction 
provided for spacecraft operations on the occultation 
entry and exit times proved to be very accurate.   
No extra manoeuvre was needed immediately after the 
swing-by. The cost of the swing-by errors was absorbed 
in the deterministic TCM-10 in April 2007 (Section 2) 
5.5 Swing-by Anomaly 
As detailed in [1] an anomalous prograde ∆v at 
pericentre passage was observed at Rosetta’s first 
swing-by around the Earth. This has also been observed 
by other non-ESA spacecraft when performing an Earth 
swing-by. The source of this anomalous ∆v still remains 
unexplained.  
To the knowledge of the authors these anomalies have 
not been observed at swing-bys around planets other 
than the Earth. Nevertheless, special attention was paid 
when a post swing-by orbit solution was generated 
using all available tracking data around Rosetta’s Mars 
swing-by. It can be reported here that no anomalous ∆v 
was detected. Whether this is due to the lack of tracking 
data close to the pericentre (Section 3)  which would 
have been most sensitive to an alleged ∆v or due to the 
fact that the swing-by body was not the Earth remains 
unknown. The authors are looking forward to Rosetta’s 
next Earth swing-by in November 2007. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
In terms of navigation, Rosetta’s Mars swing-by has 
been considered as the most critical and demanding 
phase of the heliocentric cruise up until arrival at the 
comet in 2014. It was executed very successfully with a 
 10
very small cost of propellant to compensate for targeting 
errors. The largest part of these have been known and 
accepted already in advance with the advantage of not 
having to execute another TCM shortly before the 
swing-by. It has been stressed that among other things 
the navigation went so flawlessly thanks to the frequent 
∆DOR measurements that augmented the conventional 
Doppler and range tracking data.  
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